



**Directorate of  
Intelligence**

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# Narcotics Review

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**June 1986**

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**Narcotics Review**

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**Japan: Yakuza Involvement in Drug Trafficking**

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Organized criminal groups known as Yakuza control virtually all the trafficking of stimulants—the drug of choice—in Japan and have recently branched out into heroin trafficking overseas, primarily to the United States. Japanese police have begun to crack down on domestic Yakuza activities, but legal restraints and rivalries within Japan's enforcement community are hindering their efforts.

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**Suriname: Drug Arrest Shakes Regime**

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The recent arrest on drug charges in Miami of Capt. Etienne Boerenveen, a member of Suriname's five-man ruling junta, poses a serious threat to the regime. Although Boerenveen's conviction is not likely to spark broad resistance to the unpopular government, the affair has tarnished the image of Comdr. Desi Bouterse's regime and probably will eliminate any chance of its gaining new foreign aid.

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**Ecuador: Prospects for Expansion of the Illicit Drug Trade**

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Although the cocaine trade has eclipsed other forms of drug trafficking in Ecuador, it has failed to become the highly organized criminal endeavor that prevails in other Andean countries. With revenues, both legal and illegal, from the oil trade now sharply curtailed, the Ecuadorean economic underground may be looking to the narcotics trade as an alternative source of foreign exchange. If so, a union of Colombian and Ecuadorean trafficking interests may emerge that would produce a more efficient and dangerous criminal class in Ecuador.

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**Pakistan: Press Coverage of Narcotics**

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The lifting of martial law and restoration of the democratic process has given Pakistan's press more freedom to report on social problems. The Pakistan Narcotics Control Board has been attempting to focus media attention on drugs to raise public awareness of the threat. An analysis of narcotics coverage in the Pakistani press during the first quarter of 1986, however, indicates that this awareness program is making little progress.

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**Colombia: Carlos Lehder Rivas—A Cocaine Kingpin** [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

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One of Colombia's leading cocaine traffickers, Carlos Lehder, is also Bogota's most wanted drug fugitive. Originally sought in connection with the 1984 assassination of Colombia's Minister of Justice, Lehder has become a bigger concern for the government because of his alleged ties to subversive organizations.  
[Redacted]

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**Worldwide Narcotics Highlights (U)**  
A summary of key developments from 1 April 1986 to 1 June 1986. [Redacted]

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*This review is published bimonthly by the Directorate of Intelligence and examines international, regional, and functional issues related to the worldwide drug problem. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as other US Government agencies will be considered for publication.* [Redacted]  
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Japan: Yakuza Involvement in  
Drug Trafficking

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Involvement In Domestic Drug Trafficking

Japan's National Police Agency (NPA) believes members of Japan's organized crime groups—commonly referred to as Yakuza—are deeply involved in domestic trafficking of stimulants. Although their data are sketchy, police estimate that 50 to 60 percent of Yakuza's annual income comes from drug sales. We suspect that officials may be intentionally underestimating the Yakuza's income because of the societal custom of downplaying organized crime problems.


On the basis of evidence from a number of drug raids, Japanese police have determined that Asian traffickers supply most of the approximately 2 to 3 tons of stimulants smuggled into Japan each year. South Korean groups with ties to the Yakuza traditionally have been the major suppliers. Within the past two years, however, a South Korean police crackdown on the manufacture of illegal drugs has diminished that country's importance as a supply center.

Methods of smuggling drugs into Japan vary. According to the US Embassy, South Korean-produced stimulants are smuggled into Japan via ship, with Pusan and Inchon being major exit points in South Korea. Recent arrests of drug smugglers at Narita International Airport outside Tokyo indicate commercial air routes are another option. Once the drugs are in Japan, Yakuza gangs use their legal businesses—nightclubs and restaurants—as distribution centers.

Tokyo's Actions

Fearing that drug abuse in Japan—although low by international standards—is aggravating problems such as juvenile delinquency, Japanese officials have developed a two-prong enforcement campaign to contain the growth and increasing sophistication of Yakuza drug trafficking. Components of the

Figure 1  
1980 Yakuza Revenues<sup>a</sup>



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<sup>a</sup> Total estimated revenue 4,576.2 million US dollars.

<sup>b</sup> Average 1980 exchange rate 226.74 yen = 1 US dollars.

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campaign, nicknamed Operation Crackdown and Operation Direct Control, were devised to raise public sensitivity to the evils of organized crime and to diminish Yakuza's ability to obtain money and weapons. In particular, the police are:

- Publicizing the gangs' illegal activities, specifically drug trafficking, in the media and in the government's yearend reports on crime.
- Encouraging communities to take action against the Yakuza. The Police hope the public will refuse to patronize businesses linked to the Yakuza.
- Making mass arrests and confiscating weapons during police raids on gang offices.

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### Profile of the Yakuza

*The Yakuza trace their roots to the Samurai warriors. With the breakup of the feudal government in Japan in the early 17th century, Samurai found themselves without a source of income. Unskilled at other occupations, these warriors apparently banded together to set up illegal moneymaking operations such as gambling, extortion, and prostitution.* [ ]

*The Yakuza attracts down-on-their-luck members of the lower classes, typically laborers and dock workers, who view gang membership as a chance to get ahead. The strong social pressure in Japan to belong to a group adds to the attractiveness of gangs. Yakuza members are easily recognizable: extensive body tattoos are used as a display of gang loyalty and chopping off the little finger at the knuckle signals as atonement for a mistake. Their fondness for flashy clothes and foreign automobiles has also gained them notoriety.* [ ]

*The gangs are set up in a hierarchical fashion with the senior boss and his lieutenants wielding considerable power over several hundred smaller gangs, each of which usually controls one illegal enterprise in a specific geographical area. The Yakuza number about 110,000, and the 2,500 individual gangs are organized into 83 groupings.* [ ]

*Japanese police have identified several major gangs that are active in drug trafficking:*

- *Yamaguchi-gumi is the largest, with over 10,000 members and operations in 30 prefectures. The Yamaguchi-gumi, home based in the busy port of Kobe, has extensive ties to harbor businesses. Police believe the group has used its connections in the shipping industry to develop an extensive drug trafficking network.* [ ]
- *Police officials suspect that Inagawa-kai, which is known to have members residing in Hong Kong, collaborates with the Yamaguchi-gumi gang in overseas drug trafficking activities. The two gangs took an oath in 1972 to cooperate against the police. With 4,500 members, the group is involved in smuggling Taiwan-manufactured stimulants into Japan,* [ ]
- *Considered the most violent of the gangs, Sumiyoshi Rengo-kai also is involved in drug trafficking, specifically heroin.* [ ] *the Sumiyoshi Rengo-kai has a number of gang-owned enterprises in Hawaii and is participating in the US drug trade. Headquartered in Tokyo, the organization has 112 lesser gangs under its umbrella, and approximately 5,700 members.* [ ]

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According to Japanese police, public response to these campaigns is positive. For example, fear of violence that often accompanies Yakuza activities has prompted some Japanese to refuse to rent houses and offices to gang members. [ ]

#### Enforcement Constraints

Police efforts to suppress Yakuza trafficking activities are stifled to a large extent by the Japanese legal system. Undercover operations are especially difficult because judges often interpret laws narrowly; evidence gained through entrapment or inducement is considered inadmissible. Police also are frustrated by

the ban on the use of wiretaps (permitted only in assassination or espionage cases). These restrictions, coupled with the Yakuza oath of silence—gang members rarely testify against one another—make it difficult for the police to develop comprehensive cases against the gangs. [ ]


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Furthermore, the fight against drug trafficking is handicapped by the lack of cooperation within Japan's drug enforcement community. According to the US Embassy, fierce competition among the enforcement

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**Figure 2**  
**Japan: Arrests for Stimulant Offenses, 1975-84<sup>a</sup>**




<sup>a</sup> Japanese National Police Agency data.

[Redacted]

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**Figure 3**  
**Japan: Violation of Major Penal Code Offenses by Juveniles, 1949-84<sup>a</sup>**



<sup>a</sup> Japanese National Police Agency data.

[Redacted]

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agencies—the NPA, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare—has hindered information sharing and led the agencies to concentrate on small-time traffickers and users. This has boosted department arrest statistics but has had little impact on the infrastructure of the Yakuza trafficking networks. [Redacted]

**Moving Into Overseas Drug Markets**

While Tokyo's enforcement efforts remain focused on the Yakuza's domestic activities, evidence suggests that Yakuza gangs also operate in other Asian drug markets such as Hong Kong and Bangkok. Ostensibly, nightclubs and travel services run by the Yakuza in Hong Kong service the Japanese tourist trade, but obviously they could also facilitate drug smuggling. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Yakuza contacts in Bangkok, who are mostly Japanese nationals, supply them with heroin and act as couriers for drug shipments from Thailand. [Redacted]

Japanese crime organizations may well be hoping to capitalize on the large US market, using Hawaii as their base of operations. [Redacted] Yakuza gangs came to Hawaii in the late 1960s to set up gambling and prostitution rings aimed at the Japanese tourist market. Violence between the Yakuza and Hawaiian criminal elements has not erupted, a good indication that tacit approval has been given for the Yakuza presence. More recently, the Yakuza have reportedly begun to invest in nightclubs, export offices, and tour agencies in Pacific coast states as well. US law enforcement officials believe these businesses are fronts for a number of illegal activities such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and smuggling arms into Japan where they are illegal. [Redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] few arrests of gang members have been made in the last decade. A sting operation in Hawaii last fall, however, resulted in the arrest of three key members of the largest Yakuza gang and the seizure of \$56 million of heroin and amphetamines. Though not the biggest source of Yakuza income in the United States, we believe heroin trafficking provides the Yakuza an attractive method to finance the purchase of firearms. [redacted]

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### International Cooperation

To date, Tokyo's efforts to cope with the international dimension of Yakuza drug trafficking have been meager. Information sharing with the United States and other East Asian nations has provoked little interest from Japanese enforcement officials who prefer to tackle organized crime problems on their own. Certain ministries are more enthusiastic, partly because of increased attention being paid to the fight against drug trafficking on the international level. For example, at a recent Summit Seven Foreign Ministers' meeting, Foreign Minister Abe stressed the importance of bilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and other Asian countries in combating drug trafficking in Northeast Asia. [redacted]

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Despite the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MFA) eagerness to take on a more responsible international role, however, domestic rivalries and political sensitivities are likely to constrain Tokyo's initiatives in this regard. According to the US Embassy, Japanese Customs, the NPA, and the Justice Ministry are dragging their feet on MFA directives to improve bilateral cooperation because they are worried that the Foreign Ministry will move in on their bureaucratic turf. In addition, the MFA has expressed its concern that Japanese sovereignty was infringed upon because of DEA investigations in Japan prior to the arrest of the three Yakuza members in Hawaii. It also implied that this may restrict Tokyo's cooperation with US officials in connection with the trial. In our view, such domestic issues will play a key role in influencing governmentwide willingness to be forthcoming during future bilateral exchanges on drug trafficking. [redacted]

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## Suriname: Drug Arrest Shakes Regime

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### The Arrest and Its Aftermath

Capt. Etienne Boerenveen, a member of Suriname's five-man ruling junta, was arrested on 24 March and charged with conspiracy to import and distribute narcotics in the United States. According to press reports, Boerenveen, together with an executive of the Surinamese airline and the executive's father, met twice with US undercover agents in the Miami area. During these taped sessions, Boerenveen allegedly offered to guarantee cocaine smugglers safe passage through Suriname for \$1 million a shipment and agreed that his country could be used as a transshipment point for ether and acetone, chemicals used to produce cocaine. He also described himself as the number-two man in Suriname and said he could "guarantee safe passage to anything or anybody."

Perhaps fearful that testimony during a trial would implicate him, Bouterse at first maneuvered for Boerenveen's release. Surinamese officials initially reacted to the arrest by charging "North American intelligence agencies" with framing Boerenveen. At one point, it appeared that the government might fight Boerenveen's prosecution by claiming diplomatic immunity. But Bouterse seemed unwilling to jeopardize a thaw in Suriname's diplomatic relations and possible foreign aid by using this ploy.

### Aid Pressure

The drug scandal apparently has alienated a number of Western countries that seemed on the verge of providing aid to Suriname. According to US Embassy reporting, the arrest has confirmed Dutch suspicions about the unsavory nature of Bouterse's regime. The scandal also may block proposed medical aid and prevent any possible resumption of some \$600 million in development aid suspended since the junta's murder of political opponents in 1982. The Boerenveen case, coming on the heels of allegations of

Surinamese involvement in drug and illegal immigrant traffic into neighboring French Guiana, will effectively squelch Paris's previous sympathy for the regime, according to the Embassy. In addition, the Venezuelan Ambassador doubts his government will again show generosity toward Suriname, and Brazil's reaction may be similar.

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Without new foreign aid, the economy will register a substantial reverse this year, as foreign exchange reserves are depleted and imports are slashed. Bouterse has been draining hard currency reserves to finance purchases of consumer merchandise and producer goods despite the continuing slump in the key bauxite sector and the suspension of Dutch aid. As a result, foreign exchange reserves of over \$200 million in the early 1980s have deteriorated to about \$20 million at present, or only enough to cover about three weeks' worth of imports. Payment difficulties recently delayed completion of a Brazilian natural gas delivery, and similar actions by other commodity suppliers are likely over the next few months as arrearages mount.

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### Outlook

The Boerenveen affair might worsen tensions among junta members already concerned about Bouterse's support for democratization measures. Military dissatisfaction over his dialogue with opposition parties has led to coup rumors involving Comdr. Paul Bhagwandas and Operations Officer Arthy Gorre, both members of the five-man junta. In our judgment, the rift in the junta could widen if convincing evidence surfaces that Bouterse and Boerenveen were working together in a major drug-trafficking scheme.

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**Ecuador: Prospects for  
Expansion of the Illicit  
Drug Trade** [redacted]

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A small-scale but complex illicit narcotics industry has flourished in Ecuador for several decades. In the 1960s and early 1970s locally produced and refined heroin, imported heroin, cocaine hydrochloride (HCL), and LSD all reportedly were available both for purchase in Ecuador and for delivery abroad. Guayaquil, the center of the drug trade, was viewed as a mecca by US hippies and others seeking to experiment with a variety of mind-altering substances (map). Reports of opium poppy cultivation and heroin refining in Ecuador still surface from time to time, but coca products now dominate the illicit narcotics trade even though coca culture and coca leaf consumption are not indigenous. [redacted]

**Origins of Drug Trafficking**

Although pervasive, drug trafficking in Ecuador has always been unprofessional by regional standards. Rather than a specialized criminal activity, it has tended to remain either an adjunct of generalized smuggling or a sideline for those engaged in legitimate economic pursuits. For example:

- Francisco Adum-Adum, an Ecuadorean of Lebanese descent, probably was the country's foremost narcotics trafficker in the 1970s. A lawyer and politician, he is widely reported to have begun cocaine trafficking while still Chief of Police in Guayaquil. Upon retirement he and several associates founded a chemical firm, CELOPLAST, which is believed to have produced ingredients used in narcotics refining. Adum and associates subsequently learned to refine both cocaine HCL and heroin, which were marketed in the United States by Mexican intermediaries. [redacted]

[redacted]

**Drug Crop Cultivation in Ecuador**

**Opium**

*Opium poppies were cultivated legally and on a fairly wide scale in Ecuador during World War II when traditional Asian sources of morphine were denied to the United States and its allies. Legal poppy culture was terminated after the war, but illicit cultivation persisted. [redacted] stands of opium poppy were fairly widespread in the Andean Provinces of Pichincha, Canar, Loja, Chimborazo, Bolivar, and Tungurahua in the 1970s before the heroin trade was eclipsed by cocaine trafficking. More recent reports of poppy fields generally have not been substantiated.* [redacted]

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**Coca**

*There is no indigenous tradition of coca leaf production and consumption in Ecuador. Over the years small amounts have been grown sporadically throughout Ecuador, apparently for commercial purposes, but local growers have never offered any real competition to suppliers from Peru.* [redacted]

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**Cannabis**

*Unlike coca and opium poppy, cannabis appears to be cultivated in Ecuador primarily for local use.* [redacted]

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- [redacted] somewhat larger loads of narcotics were intermingled with other products by a number of enterprising exporters of agricultural produce as well as a lumber company and a manufacturer of Chinese foods. Many professional smugglers reportedly paid for consumer goods procured in Panama with Ecuadorean-refined cocaine. [redacted]

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Despite the presence of such activity, none of Ecuador's fledgling trafficking organizations developed into the powerful, aggressive, and integrated operations characteristic of other Andean countries. The oil boom in Ecuador during the 1970s may have been most responsible for the arrested development of Ecuadorean organizations. With foreign exchange from oil sales and the oil industry's time-honored methods of graft so readily available, the drug trade never attracted the kinds of ambitious criminal entrepreneurs that could pull together the fragmented trade. [redacted]

**The Cocaine Trade**

Ecuadoreans entered the cocaine hydrochloride trade well before the Colombians; but, when no strong Ecuadorean organizations emerged, Colombian organizations soon dominated. [redacted]

[redacted]

Because of this failure to compete successfully in the cocaine HCL business, coca base and paste trafficking to Colombia remain the backbone of the Ecuadorean narcotics trade. According to Embassy estimates, some 75 percent of the coca paste entering Ecuador from Peru ultimately is transferred to Colombians either as paste or as Ecuadorean-refined base. Now, as in the past, procurement of coca paste from Peru is a specialty of local trafficking groups in El Oro and Loja Provinces. While established trading patterns exist, most of these coca paste traffickers are not formally associated with the organizations that purchase their product and they are under no obligation to maintain a steady supply. [redacted]

[redacted] two principal routes and two apparently independent constellations of traffickers accommodate the base-paste trade through Ecuador to Colombia. Some shipments go by sea to the Ecuadorean port of Esmeraldas and from there to Tumaco in Colombia. The principal overland route is via Quito to the border towns of Tulcan and Ipiales. An alternate, less frequently used crossing point also reportedly exists in the Lago Agrio area of Napo Province. [redacted]

[redacted]

Even the relatively uncomplicated business of paste and base trafficking in Ecuador appears to suffer from amateurism and other organizational disorders.

[redacted]

**Recent Changes**

The fallout from recent events in both Ecuador and Colombia is beginning to substantially alter the milieu in which Ecuadorean traffickers operate. Perhaps the most important occurrence in this regard was the assassination of Colombian Justice Minister Lara Bonilla and the subsequent crackdown on trafficking in Colombia. Concurrently, oil prices, after sliding for several years, plunged abruptly, greatly reducing economic options for everyone in Ecuador. This could again focus attention on drug trafficking as an underground source of foreign exchange. [redacted]

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At present the impact of the stepped-up Colombian enforcement campaign is most obvious. [redacted]

[redacted] While the extent and exact configuration of this invasion still is a matter of conjecture, we either know with some degree of reliability or suspect the following:

- Colombian traffickers are involved in growing coca in the provinces of Ecuador adjacent to the Colombian border. There is little doubt coca cultivation in the area has expanded enormously. Whereas the labor force clearly is Ecuadorean, much of the financing and management appears to be Colombian. [redacted]
- At least one Colombian trafficking group, [redacted] is now purchasing chemicals for coca processing through Guayaquil firms. Recourse to Ecuadorean firms for chemicals is highly logical given tighter controls in other areas, and we strongly suspect that many Colombian organizations are exploiting this option. Such activity could account in part for the larger quantity of cocaine chemicals now being seized by Ecuadorean authorities, according to Embassy reporting. [redacted]
- In 1985 the last of four large cocaine HCL shipments from Colombia to the United States via Esmareldas was captured by Ecuadorean authorities, and a number of Ecuadorean collaborators were arrested. [redacted]
- [redacted] claim that Colombians or Ecuadoreans serving as Colombian surrogates are operating a cocaine HCL refinery at Cayambe. [redacted]

The recent downturn in oil prices unquestionably will influence the course of the Ecuadorean narcotics trade along with all other economic activity in the country. To a generation of Ecuadoreans accustomed to relative affluence, drug trafficking and other contraband smuggling offer the only means of maintaining lifestyles in the face of restrictions on foreign exchange expenditures that seem likely to come in the wake of the oil price slide. [redacted]

#### Expansion A Possibility

Theoretically, the Ecuadoreans could establish downstream operations that would ensure greater access to major cocaine HCL markets. [redacted]

[redacted] We doubt, however, that significant penetration of the US market could occur without at least the tacit consent of the Colombians—who appear now to dominate even the Mexican intermediary network that once channeled Ecuadorean cocaine HCL to the United States—or an alliance with US organized crime. An alternative would be to exploit the European market in competition with the Colombians, the Peruvians, and the Bolivians. Past experience in exchanging cocaine for heroin in Europe might give the Ecuadoreans an edge. [redacted]

The Ecuadoreans probably could increase their involvement in the downstream cocaine trade most readily by becoming an adjunct of the “Medellin cartel.” Among established Ecuadorean traffickers, however, such a subordinate arrangement may be slow to be accepted. [redacted], Colombians operating in the Ecuadorean interior traditionally have been viewed as carpetbaggers and as fodder for hungry drug enforcement agencies. Indeed, the current focus of Ecuadorean enforcement

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efforts on seizure of cocaine HCL shipments and on crop eradication along the Colombian border suggests a vendetta against alien trafficking activity.

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For the Ecuadorean cocaine trade to expand significantly, some accomodation with the Colombians clearly must occur, perhaps by a new generation of Ecuadorean traffickers more amenable to Colombian tutelage. Such groups, if they develop, may more nearly resemble the efficient Colombian trafficking organizations than the dilettantes who preceded them. Indeed, this possibility may be what has persuaded Febres Cordero to concentrate his limited enforcement resources on the "Colombian connection." If he fails to stem the tide, given the lack of political consensus in the country, a criminalization of Ecuadorean society could occur unless:

- The financial oligarchy that controls most Ecuadorean economic affairs is outraged and takes action to isolate the new criminal groups.
- The military maintains some integrity and steps in as an effective counterforce against the traffickers.

In the meantime, the complicated relationships between Colombian and Ecuadorean traffickers could provide considerable grist for both intelligence collection and enforcement activity.

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## Pakistan: Press Coverage of Narcotics [REDACTED]

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### Introduction

Heightening public and official awareness of the drug issue via the mass media is an essential element of US counternarcotics strategy. Nowhere is a successful, media-based drug education program more needed than in Pakistan, which grows opium, refines and trafficks heroin, and suffers from escalating rates of heroin abuse—activities largely ignored by the general public. A comprehensive education and information program recently began in earnest in Pakistan under the auspices of the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB), with funding from the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), and guidance and assistance from the United States Information Service and the American Embassy Narcotics Assistance Unit. Through distribution of narcotics-related publications to the mass media, selected segments of the public and government officials, the PNCB is attempting to raise and maintain the consciousness of the Pakistani public to the dangers of drugs. Martial law ended at about the same time that this revitalized program began, ushering in an era of greater press openness and offering an opportunity for a substantial increase in media coverage of the narcotics problem. [REDACTED]

### Press Coverage Weak

One method used by academics to track press coverage involves systematically analyzing leading newspapers and periodicals for a specific period of time. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the PNCB awareness campaign is making little measureable headway. Narcotics-related articles were published infrequently—almost never on the front page—and the majority were simple briefs on arrests or seizures (chart). Furthermore, those items not concerning

arrests or seizures were generally limited to coverage of major meetings or speeches on narcotics by government authorities. There were essentially no aggressive, hard-hitting investigative articles or surveys that would encourage grassroots efforts to combat the narcotics threat. According to an authority on the South Asian press, the Urdu-language papers, though concerned with social problems, lack the resources for such investigative journalism.<sup>1</sup> The English-language press appeals to an elite readership not particularly receptive to or interested in narcotics-related articles. It concentrates primarily on economic news, with secondary emphasis on political and cultural events. [REDACTED]

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The Karachi *Morning News*—published in English and managed by the government-controlled National Press Trust—comes closest to focusing on the intricacies of the narcotics problem. It divides its coverage almost equally between analysis of the various aspects of the drug issue and briefs on arrests or seizures. Echoing Islamabad's sentiments, however, it has run several articles condemning the United States and other developed countries for failing to adopt harsh measures to check their own involvement in international drug trafficking. Furthermore, the extent of its influence on the public is subject to question, since the *Morning News* has a daily circulation of only 90,000 and is widely viewed as a government mouthpiece. [REDACTED]

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<sup>1</sup> Chronic newsprint shortages since 1971, along with inflationary trends since 1972, have resulted in increasingly high costs of production and distribution. In addition, Pakistan has more dailies than advertising and readership can support. These problems have undermined press economic viability and have led to an increase in the price of newspapers, creating a decline in circulations. [REDACTED]

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## Narcotics Coverage, First Quarter 1986

	Language	Location	Estimated 1985 Circulation	Comment
<b>Daily newspapers</b>				
<i>Amn</i>	Urdu	Karachi	No circulation figures available	Independent, liberal, skeptical of US and Zia's Afghan policy
<i>Jang</i>	Urdu	Karachi, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Quetta	507,000	Independent, conservative, pro-Arab, no political affiliation
<i>Jasarat</i>	Urdu	Karachi	50,000	Independent, liberal, influenced by the Jamaat-i-Islami, Sunni fundamentalist
<i>Mashriq</i>	Urdu	Peshawar, Karachi, Quetta	160,000	Managed by government-controlled National Press Trust
<i>Nawa-i-Waqt</i>	Urdu	Lahore, Karachi, Rawalpindi, Multan	250,000	Independent, democratic with Islamic orientation, anti-Communist
<i>Dawn</i>	English	Karachi	70,000	Independent, liberal, no political affiliation
<i>Morning News</i>	English	Karachi	90,000	Managed by government-controlled National Press Trust
<i>Muslim</i>	English	Islamabad	30,000	Independent, pro-Iranian, skeptical of US and Zia's Afghan policy
<i>The Pakistan Times</i>	English	Lahore, Rawalpindi	50,000	Managed by government-controlled National Press Trust
<b>Weeklies</b>				
<i>Pakistan and Gulf Economist</i>	English	Karachi	20,000	Conservative, business/economic oriented
<i>Viewpoint</i>	English	Lahore	25,000	Leftist, political/literary, may receive some Soviet funding, generally hostile to United States

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Most estimates of the number of heroin addicts range from 250,000 to 300,000, and middle- and upper-class youth are reported to be increasingly affected. However, the Government of Pakistan (GOP) apparently views drug abuse as an embarrassment rather than as a problem to be solved, and releases little information on this menace through the state-owned wire service. Hence, the Associated Press of Pakistan, which supplies the Pakistani press with as much as 60 percent of its news, concentrates on narcotics-related arrests and seizures to the virtual exclusion of information on the growing problem of domestic drug abuse. [REDACTED]

### Gadoon Incident Covered Extensively

The one exception to the limited treatment of the narcotics issue by the Pakistani press concerned the clash between government enforcement personnel and opium poppy farmers in Gadoon District last March, which was met with a crescendo of press coverage [REDACTED] Unfortunately, the increase in press coverage probably did more harm than good to the PNCB awareness effort. The overall tone of the press coverage was antigovernment and pro-opium-poppy farmers. With the lifting of martial law in late December 1985, the press was reportedly given freer

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


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**Figure 1**  
**Pakistan: Press Coverage of Narcotics**



rein to criticize the government, and apparently took advantage of the Gadoon enforcement action to do so.

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The independent press was most critical of the role of the GOP in what became known as the Gadoon incident, and most articles depicted the opium poppy growers as the innocent victims of excessive government force. For the most part, the GOP's defense of its actions was ignored. Instead, extensive coverage was given to condemnations of the operations by Member National Assembly (MNA) Yaqub Khan Jadoon and others.

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The United States also received its share of blame in editorials printed by the independent papers during March. Although the editorial writers for these papers were generally opposed to narcotics production, some argued that poppy cultivation was a tradition and that the GOP antinarcotics policy was adopted due to pressure by the United States. The influential Islamabad *Muslim*—an English daily—was quite sharp in its criticism and repeatedly blamed the United States for the police action. Other independent papers added to the outcry. For example, the Lahore *Nawa-i-Waqt* in Urdu stated that the United States complains about Pakistani heroin getting into the hands of American youth, when it should really think about “stemming the flow of narcotics pills and capsules being manufactured in US laboratories and exported to Pakistan” and elsewhere.

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The newspapers run by the government-controlled National Press Trust carried numerous stories relating the GOP's defense of its actions and the denial of US Government involvement in the incident by Minister of Interior Aslam Khatak and US Attorney General Edwin Meese. However, two of the papers, the Peshawar *Mashriq* in Urdu and the Lahore *Pakistan Times* in English, each carried one editorial during March in which they disapproved of the force used against the poppy growers. In addition, all of these Trust papers covered items like the protest rallies of poppy growers in the Gadoon Valley and MNA Yaqub Khan Jadoon's speech to the national assembly in which he told a sympathetic audience

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**The Gadoon Incident**

*The Gadoon District Enforcement Action was an antinarcotics operation against the border tribes in the Northwest Frontier Province. On 8 March 1986, 100 platoons—some 450 troops—of the frontier constabulary supported by the police moved into Gadoon-Amazai, the site of a US-funded development project, to enforce the poppy ban. They were met with armed resistance from the opium poppy growers, who objected to eradication so late in the growing season that substitute cash crops could not be planted. In the fighting between the constabulary and the growers, five persons were killed and 31 were injured. In a second clash, a demonstration against enforcement became unruly, and another eight persons were killed and 13 wounded. According to Embassy reporting, only 25 percent of the Gadoon area poppy crop—some 220 hectares—was destroyed during the operation. MNA Yaqub Khan Jadoon was arrested for inciting the demonstrators, but was later released on bail by authorities. Even so, the arrest of Jadoon precipitated a walkout in the National Assembly. As a result, the federal government ordered withdrawal of the forces and the eradication effort was halted. A judicial inquiry was ultimately conducted, and the remainder of the poppy crop was harvested without further incident in early April.*

that the enforcement was enacted with American backing. Hence, even the government's "mouth-pieces" failed to support it wholeheartedly after the Gadoon enforcement action.

**Response From the Public Disappointing**

Public response to the narcotics issue was minimal in both the English-language and Urdu-language press, an indication that the awareness program is making little headway. Very few letters to the editor were carried, even during March, and the content of those published indicated little support among literate Pakistanis for the GOP poppy crop eradication program. Approximately two-thirds of the letters condemned the GOP enforcement action at Gadoon, and several suggested that poppy cultivation be made

legal again. One letter put it, "in our subcontinent poppy cultivation has been going on since time immemorial and is a source of bread and butter for many families." Another stated: "If USA is so keen to stop illegal production of poppy, let it buy our crop legally as it is doing from India and let Pakistan earn some badly needed foreign exchange." In addition, our press analysis indicated that Pakistanis have not changed their perception that narcotics is a western problem. Nearly 50 percent of the letters that were printed during March referred to the United States' domestic drug problems. One letter asked: "How or why should Gadoon be accountable for the diseases in the U.S. and their ever increasing thirst for heroin?"

We believe that the public's unwillingness to acknowledge narcotics as a domestic problem is rooted in the culture of Pakistan. According to academic sources, Pakistanis do not tend to see themselves as culprits—they prefer to fault others. This behavior is reinforced when high Pakistan Government officials publicly blame narcotics problems on western countries. For example, even when the Pakistani Federal Minister of State for Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Mir Nawaz Khan Marwat, made a call for an endless "Jihad" against drugs in late February 1986, he stated that Pakistan was being blamed without any valid reason or justification for being a bastion of drug producers and traffickers, although the responsibility lay with the administrations of the developed countries. This speech was well publicized and underscores the fact that even GOP officials do not fully comprehend the dimensions of Pakistan's narcotics problem.

**Realizing the Media's Potential**

We believe the Pakistani media is on the threshold of a new stage of growth and influence. The lifting of martial law in Pakistan has inspired a boom in the newspaper business. A new English-language daily, *The Frontier Post*, has recently been started in Peshawar and the publishers of the two largest Urdu papers, *Jang* and *Nawa-i-Waqt*, are actively considering the launching of their own English papers

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from Karachi and Lahore. Moreover, the radio and television industries in Pakistan are growing rapidly. There are more than 5 million radios in use in Pakistan, and the GOP has stated that 85 percent of the Pakistani people now listen regularly. Television sets now number 1.24 million and sales are reportedly growing at an annual rate of 35 percent. Furthermore, international economic aid donors have agreed to help establish a second television channel that will run educational and instructional programs geared to serving the needs of the people. The potential influence of the media, in our opinion, may be even more extensive than these numbers indicate. Although the functional literacy rate is only 10 percent, literate Pakistanis frequently read newspapers aloud in public for the benefit of their illiterate friends and neighbors. The GOP estimates that about eight people watch each television set, and radios also have multiple listeners.

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We judge that drawing the media's attention to the issue of domestic drug abuse offers the best prospect of swaying Pakistani public opinion and should be the centerpiece of the awareness program. A significant portion of new heroin addicts—and the number is rising rapidly by President Zia's own admission—are educated, middle- and upper-class urban males. These youth are not only vital to Pakistan's future; some are the sons of the most influential members of society. The Urdu-language newspapers, which tend to be concerned with social issues, would be a natural starting point for a stepped-up awareness program. The independent ones in particular are less likely to avoid controversy and would readily publish articles realistically portraying the severity of the domestic drug abuse situation.

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**Columbia: Carlos Lehder Rivas—  
A Cocaine Kingpin** [redacted]

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President Belisario Betancur has called Carlos Lehder the most wanted fugitive in Colombia's "all-out war" against drug traffickers. US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials have characterized him as one of the world's leading cocaine traffickers, whose organization has supplied a major portion of the cocaine entering the United States in recent years. Lehder is widely reported to have ties to subversive groups, and press articles estimate his personal fortune at over \$500 million. [redacted]

[redacted] his behavior is increasingly erratic, and it is likely that he is a heavy user of cocaine. [redacted]

**A Former Politician**

Lehder is a West German citizen and Nazi sympathizer who led a pro-Nazi government in his Colombian hometown of Armenia in the early 1980s. In 1982 he purchased the weekly newspaper *Quindio Libre* (named for Lehder's home state), which he later used as a platform for his strongly nationalistic political party, the Latin National Movement. [redacted]

Lehder and his party have advocated nationalization of banks and multinational corporations and expulsion from Latin America of Protestant missionary groups. The self-proclaimed redeemer of his home state, Lehder used his wealth in the past to dominate local politics, giving money to the poor at political rallies. Nevertheless, Lehder was unsuccessful in a campaign for the Senate in the early 1980s. [redacted]

**A Fugitive From Justice**

Press articles have linked Lehder to various assassination plots against Betancur, Venezuelan officials, and US diplomats. Among the crimes for which he is being sought by Colombian officials is his alleged complicity in the 1984 assassination of Justice Minister Lara Bonilla, who had been a vigorous prosecutor of narcotics traffickers. Lehder is also wanted on drug charges in the United States. After Bonilla's death, Lehder went into hiding and has



Carlos Lehder [redacted]

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evaded extradition to the United States, which Betancur had ordered in May 1984 under the provisions of a bilateral treaty signed in 1982. [redacted]

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In an attempt to capture Lehder, Colombian police raided one of his farms in April 1985. Although Lehder escaped, police seized over \$1.5 million in cash and 770 pounds of cocaine. They also found numerous documents linking Lehder to possible money laundering activity in The Bahamas. [redacted]

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**Guerrilla Connections**

Lehder has boasted of ties to the M-19 and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). [redacted] he has also been in contact with other Colombian guerrilla groups. Early

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in 1985 he announced his intention to organize a "500-thousand-man force," a statement that clearly was a product of Lehder's megalomania. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] he may now be the leader of a small guerrilla group, the Patria Libre, which has ties to the FARC. [REDACTED]

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Lehder characterizes these guerrilla connections as patriotic and has said that cocaine and marijuana have become "a revolutionary weapon against American imperialism." Although Lehder is fervently anti-United States, we believe his primary concerns are for himself and his drug business. His opposition to "US imperialism," which he has claimed he would fight with his Army, is probably derived from his fear of being extradited to stand trial on drug charges in the United States. In addition, his ties to the FARC, which engages in mutually beneficial arrangements with drug traffickers, probably center on protecting his drug activities. [REDACTED]

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Lehder's alleged ties to insurgents could benefit him if he is ever arrested in Colombia on drug charges. Under Colombian law, the insurgent connection could result in his being tried as a subversive in Colombia, where he can influence the judicial process through bribery and intimidation, rather than being extradited to the United States where his chances of being convicted for drug trafficking are much greater. [REDACTED]

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Worldwide Narcotics Highlights [redacted]

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South America

Several recent clashes between antinarcotics forces and insurgents in *Colombia's* southeast jungles probably will cause Bogota to curtail its recently intensified drive against large cocaine refining centers located in this area. During May, special antinarcotics units of the National Police had two skirmishes with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the country's largest insurgent group, and one with forces suspected of belonging to the smaller People's Liberation Army. In the most serious attack, four police agents were killed when their patrol—returning from a successful cocaine laboratory raid nearby—was ambushed by 50 to 60 FARC troops armed with rockets and automatic weapons. [redacted] the laboratory operator ordered the attack in retaliation for the police raid on the laboratory. While the ambush demonstrates the collusion that sometimes exists between traffickers and the subversives, the other attacks—which stemmed from what the Embassy characterized as chance encounters—represent the growing danger the police face as they try to extend their influence in guerrilla-controlled territory. [redacted]

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US Embassy observers who made low-level flights over much of northern *Colombia* at the start of the marijuana growing season in April report that cultivation in the northeastern mountains—once Colombia's leading marijuana-producing area—appears to be significantly lower than in previous years. Although it was too early in the growing season to estimate actual cultivation, the observers found that in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and in the nearby Serrania de Perija Mountains, many former marijuana fields were abandoned or planted with other crops. The small number of seedbeds observed was a further indication that cultivation is not as widespread as last year. [redacted]

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[redacted] Over the past several years, [redacted]

[redacted] cultivation was expanding in the Golfo de Uraba area as more crops in the mountains were destroyed. The US Embassy's observers found hundreds of newly cleared fields—resembling the pattern of marijuana cultivation in the northeast—scattered around the Gulf. [redacted]

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**Colombia's** newly elected President Virgilio Barco has said little about the narcotics problem, but the US Embassy in Bogota expects that he will continue counternarcotics efforts begun by President Betancur when he assumes office in August. As Ambassador to the United States in 1979, Barco signed the bilateral extradition treaty with Washington. According to Embassy reports, Barco privately told US officials that drug-related corruption has a corrosive effect on Colombian society and that he wants to cooperate with Washington in criminal investigations and reform of Colombia's cumbersome and corrupt judicial system. Barco has not stated, however, what specific antidrug actions he plans to take, especially concerning the politically sensitive and physically dangerous problems of extending marijuana eradication into areas where cultivation is expanding or attacking the major cocaine processing centers located in insurgent-controlled areas. Narcotics never became an important issue during the presidential campaign, and Barco may wait until he has addressed the country's pressing security and economic problems before developing a comprehensive drug control strategy. [ ]

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The US Embassy in La Paz reports corruption and low morale caused drug seizures by **Bolivia's** antinarcotics strike force (UMOPAR) to drop off sharply in April. [ ]

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[ ]

[ ] In early May, La Paz replaced the force's entire officer corps in an attempt to put enforcement efforts back on track. [ ]

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**Peru's** coca eradication program suffered a setback in April when President Garcia decided to suspend an important operation in the Upper Huallaga Valley—one of the country's leading coca-growing areas—rather than use force to quell an antinarcotics demonstration. According to US Embassy reports, 800 eradication workers became trapped near Uchiza when 1,000 protesters blocked the roads leading to the workers' camp. Six police officials were killed when their convoy sent to open the roadblocks was ambushed. [ ] President Garcia, believing that a forceful response would make the situation more unstable and damage his party's chances for victory in the November municipal election, ended the protest by canceling the operation. The Embassy reports that officials plan to deploy eradication workers to other parts of the valley and may try to restore order by declaring the Upper Huallaga a police emergency zone. The odds of Lima reaching its eradication target of

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6,000 hectares by the end of the year, however, are waning. The size of the protest and the police murders suggest that organized resistance and violence will increase as authorities expand the eradication campaign, and the Minister of Interior has warned that future operations may have to be slowed or canceled if eradication teams cannot be protected. [ ] 25X1

According to the US Embassy, senior officials within the Argentine Federal Police (AFP) believe that cocaine trafficking and drug abuse is on the rise in *Argentina* and that the judicial system is impeding the arrest and prosecution of traffickers. Officers are reportedly frustrated by judges' failure to provide timely arrest and seizure warrants, thereby reducing the number of cases on which the police can act. Judges in the Federal District who must authorize the warrants are inexperienced in drug matters and overloaded with other cases, causing additional enforcement delays. Interagency rivalries, a major problem that the new Antinarcotics Commission has yet to resolve, further hamper Argentine drug control efforts. In our view, these rivalries will continue to undermine narcotics control efforts unless Buenos Aires gives the AFP greater authority over national narcotics matters or creates a single antidrug enforcement organization like the US DEA. [ ] 25X1

*Uruguay* is emerging as an important transshipment center for cocaine hydrochloride (HCL) en route from South America to Europe. In late March, the Uruguayan police arrested two members of an international narcotics trafficking organization operating in Uruguay, Bolivia, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. The pair had reportedly been smuggling HCL from Bolivia through Uruguay to Europe for more than a year and a half. The cocaine was concealed in the binding of books that were carried in suitcases. The arrests resulted from a Swiss investigation that led to the detention of some 30 people in Switzerland. According to the US Embassy, Uruguayan police were unaware of the organization and acted only after a Swiss police official advised the Interpol office in Montevideo. [ ] 25X1

## Mexico

The Mexican Government reacted recently to increasing lawlessness in Sinaloa State and to opposition charges of drug-related corruption. Acting on the orders of President de la Madrid, a combined force of about 1,300 federal and state police and military personnel conducted searches throughout Sinaloa for illegal weapons and stolen vehicles. According to Mexican press reports, Institutional Revolutionary Party leaders forced three senior state officials to resign just prior to the operation, apparently because of alleged involvement with drug traffickers. Sinaloa is one of Mexico's most important opium refining and growing regions and has the highest crime rate in the country. The ruling party faces a strong challenge

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from the conservative National Action Party in a gubernatorial election there in October. De la Madrid probably was trying to deflect opposition criticism and prevent further erosion of public support. These moves might also be an attempt to divert US pressure for more forceful drug control measures. Operations were not sustained long enough to disrupt the entrenched trafficking networks in Sinaloa, however. [ ]

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Drug-related violence continues in Mexico. In April, fighting broke out on two separate occasions over marijuana cultivation rights in the states of Oaxaca and Jalisco, and 17 people were killed. The US Embassy reported that Mexican officials tried to cover up the Oaxaca incident's narcotics connection—in an apparent effort to divert attention from the government's failure to suppress the drug resurgence. Competition in the drug industry is likely to remain keen given the depressed economy, and direct government intervention will be needed to curb drug violence.

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At US insistence, Mexican drug control officials have agreed to take steps to improve the operational efficiency of the aerial spray eradication campaign:

- Three Bell 212 helicopters will be transferred to the spray program in hopes that their extended range and greater capacity will result in increased eradication.
- A Turbo Thrush fixed-wing aircraft will be integrated into the program to free more helicopters for operations against hard-to-reach fields.
- Pilots will undergo refresher training in aerial fumigation techniques to improve flight safety.

These measures probably will add to progress already achieved in 1986—the total area sprayed during the first two months was up by 8 percent over the same period in 1985. The gains, however, will be short lived unless Mexico makes a sustained effort against corruption, the greatest obstacle to improved drug eradication. [ ]

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Economic conditions are spurring marijuana cultivation in Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula. [ ] more farmers are planting marijuana between rows of henequen, a fiber plant and the region's traditional cash crop. [ ] some farmers are foregoing licit crops completely and renting their fields for marijuana cultivation. World demand and prices for henequen fiber fell dramatically after the development of synthetics, and recent efforts to persuade farmers to grow revenue-producing food crops have been unsuccessful. Distant from the focus of Mexican antidrug enforcement, the Yucatan Peninsula could move beyond its current role as a drug transshipment point to become an important marijuana growing area. [ ]

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**Caribbean**

The incoming Prime Minister of *Barbados*—elected by a landslide vote in late May—considers drug trafficking the single-greatest threat to the island's national security and is planning to crack down on drug abuse and smuggling, according to an untested source. The US Embassy reports that the newly elected Democratic Labor Party is likely to shift military resources slated for the Regional Security System toward drug enforcement. [REDACTED]

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Colombian traffickers have been smuggling bulk loads of cocaine to the United States via Jamaica and Barbados since late 1985. Stronger counternarcotics measures by Barbadian authorities could push traffickers to shift their operations to other islands of the Eastern Caribbean. Barbadian officials probably will call for increased law enforcement training and equipment from the United States and Great Britain before implementing plans for a tougher drug enforcement campaign. [REDACTED]

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The supply of marijuana in *Jamaica* may be dwindling as the island's security forces press their heightened enforcement campaign. In late April, a group of drug traffickers in the Yallahs Hill area of eastern Jamaica stole a bulk load of marijuana from a rival trafficking organization, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The stolen marijuana was not recovered, [REDACTED] and probably was exported immediately to the United States. Under normal market conditions, it is much easier for drug traders to obtain supplies directly from producers than to steal them from other traffickers. US observers who made a visual reconnaissance of Jamaica's spring 1986 marijuana crop also report cultivation at, or possibly below, last year's levels. [REDACTED]

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**Central America**

*Belizean* Government officials have promised to compensate farmers for damage to licit agricultural crops from glyphosate sprayed on marijuana fields in February. According to the US Embassy, Belizean officials will not approve further eradication—currently proposed to begin 24 June—until the United States pays for the alleged damage. Moreover, Cabinet members have pledged to avoid spraying marijuana fields in areas of licit agriculture, and some high-level officials reportedly have promised farmers advance warning of future programs. The attempts to appease Belizean farmers could delay indefinitely comprehensive marijuana eradication. [REDACTED]

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*Belize* is assuming new importance as a transshipment site for Colombian cocaine bound for the US market. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Belizeans—many of them marijuana traffickers—increasingly act as middlemen for cocaine shipments leaving Belize by small aircraft from private airstrips. Widespread corruption among the

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Belize Defense Force, the Belize National Police, and other government officials greatly facilitates these operations. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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## Southeast Asia

Precursor chemical shortages are plaguing heroin refineries near the *Thai-Burmese* border, slowing heroin processing and keeping prices high.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Traffickers are turning to chemical supplies from India and—to a lesser extent—China to make up the shortfall. [REDACTED]

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After a lull of several months, fighting between rival trafficking groups on the *Thai-Burmese* border is heating up. The coalition of trafficking groups led by the Chinese Irregular Force (CIF) and the Wa National Army (WNA) attacked several SUA border positions in April, and the two sides clashed frequently when the SUA tried to block enemy narcotics caravans from reaching the border. The CIF and WNA have increased the number of caravans to their new refinery complex at Ang Khan. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In our view, SUA fears are warranted because the alliance could give the BCP access to the narcotics markets on the border and a much-needed financial infusion. [REDACTED]

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In mid-April the SUA asked the Bokeo provincial government in *Laos* for permission to set up a camp there, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] An SUA camp could also serve as an inroad in setting up heroin refineries in Laos to supplement the group's Burmese refineries. The supply of Laotian opium is steadily increasing, and western Laos is near international marketing channels in northern Thailand. Several of the small independent refineries currently operating in Laos do business with the SUA, but the camp proposal is the first SUA attempt in recent years at establishing a direct presence there. [REDACTED]

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The resolution recently issued by the *Burmese* Communist Party's Central Committee outlawing narcotics trafficking by its members is unlikely to reduce the number of BCP narcotics caravans to the southern Shan State. Nevertheless, the resolution verifies the existence of a split within the BCP leadership over the group's involvement in trafficking. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Despite the new policy statement, we judge the economic pragmatists who favor narcotics trafficking will win out. Cuts in Chinese aid over the last several years have left the BCP more dependent on narcotics revenues to maintain field units and finance military operations in the northern Shan State. [REDACTED]

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The *Burmese* Government's antinarcotics campaign against the BCP in the Shan State will be complicated if the BCP and the Karen National Union (KNU) follow through on their mid-April agreement to cooperate against Rangoon. In the past, lack of coordination between insurgent groups allowed the government to concentrate on fighting one group at a time. Working together, the two groups would be able to plan operations so that the government would have to fight on several fronts, thus severely taxing its already limited resources. [REDACTED]

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## East Asia

*The People's Republic of China* is getting tough with drug traffickers.

[REDACTED] Chinese police and security authorities since mid-1985 have cracked down on narcotics trafficking in Yunnan, a province bordering Burma's opium-growing region. In the past year, the government executed several Chinese traffickers and is publicizing these events to deter others. Chinese courts have traditionally netted out tough sentences to convicted traffickers, but the current round of arrests and executions are new. [REDACTED]

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Prime Minister Hawke and the state premiers have kicked off a national campaign to combat drug abuse in *Australia*. The effort—which includes prime time television addresses and the distribution of a booklet on drug abuse to every household in the country—is one result of efforts over the past year to coordinate state and federal antidrug programs. At last year's national "drug summit," the government decided to spend \$70 million over the following three years on drug enforcement, education, and rehabilitation. Since then, a national phone-in campaign against drug trafficking was held to encourage people to provide the police with information about suspected drug dealers. The campaign sparked an

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internal police investigation into allegations that West Australian police were involved in the drug trade. The objectives of the current offensive are to increase public awareness of Australia's drug abuse and trafficking problem, educate the public on the government's counternarcotics measures, and stimulate community action to fight addiction. [ ]

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The government of *Papua New Guinea* is concerned that drugs are being transshipped through its country to Australia. [ ]

[ ] to Australia to investigate allegations made by an Australian prisoner that heroin was transiting Papua New Guinea en route to Australia. Investigators say this evidence has since been independently corroborated, according to the US Embassy. Also, the government has begun recently to investigate movements of Thai marijuana through Papua New Guinea by private yacht. [ ]

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#### Middle East

A dramatic rise in drug seizures during May underscores *Saudi Arabia's* increasing problems with the use of and trafficking in heroin, hashish, and amphetamines. [ ] the quantities of drugs seized and the sophisticated concealment methods used suggest the emergence of organized trafficking groups. Saudi customs officials are particularly concerned about the flow of drugs through Saudi airports from Africa and Pakistan. Growing rates of abuse, triggered by an austere social environment and high incomes, will strengthen government resolve for more stringent enforcement measures—including training customs officials in drug control and interdiction—and treatment for addicts. The possibility that illegal weapons can be shipped into the kingdom through drug networks gives added incentive for tougher government measures.

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#### Africa

Recent developments suggest that the narcotics issue is becoming a factor in Sub-Saharan politics:

- High-ranking *Mauritian* officials have been implicated in a Reunion drug network following allegations last December of Mauritian parliamentary involvement in a Netherlands-based heroin ring. According to recent US Embassy reports, the resulting scandal threatens to weaken the Jugnauth government. In response to growing public discontent and political opposition, Jugnauth has agreed to a French-directed drug investigation. [ ]
- In *Nigeria*, an internal investigation of the government-owned and -directed National Shipping Lines revealed the use of company-owned ships for drug trafficking, particularly to Europe. High-level officials implied that harsh measures would be taken in an effort to deter the traffickers and bolster Nigeria's image abroad. [ ]

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- **Zambian** President, Kenneth Kaunda, ordered the release of present and former government officials and prominent businessmen detained since last August on mandrax trafficking charges. According to US Embassy officials, rumors of high-level drug and financial corruption continue to circulate. [ ]

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**Western Europe**

Reports of increased coca cultivation and cocaine trafficking are motivating some West European governments to confront the cocaine threat. In late April, the US Embassy in Bogota reported that the **French** and **West German** Embassies plan to add full-time narcotics police to their staffs for the first time. Two French police agents and one West German agent are expected to arrive within the next several months. London initially intended to station an agent in Bogota, but backed off when the **British** Ambassador opposed the plan on security grounds. The United Kingdom, however, recently assigned two customs agents to Lima with responsibility for regional narcotics matters. **Denmark** and the **Netherlands** also have full-time agents there. The European Community's (EC) move to reach a consensus on Bolivia is another sign that West European governments are beginning to recognize the extent of the cocaine threat. According to US Embassy reporting, the EC political directors instructed their ambassadors in La Paz to recommend how the 12 countries might deal with the cocaine problem in that country. [ ]

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[ ] **Italian** criminal syndicates are attempting to take over cocaine distribution networks in Western Europe, a move resisted by Colombian criminal groups. The Colombians reportedly have their own networks combining South American controllers with West European couriers. The Colombian networks are ruthless, and Interpol expects future outbreaks of violence with the Italian organizations. [ ]

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**Southwest Asia**

**Pakistan** and **India** are moving slowly toward cooperation on narcotics matters. [ ]

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[ ] a format for exchanging narcotics information between customs officials has been drafted and is awaiting higher level approval. The general agreement between Zia and Gandhi is unlikely to result in any concrete action, however, unless both leaders become more forceful in their support for antinarcotics cooperation. Middle- and lower-level antinarcotics officials on both sides, no matter how well intentioned, are unlikely to get out in front of national leaders in an area of such political sensitivity. In our view, Indian and Pakistani officials will continue to drag their feet on antinarcotics cooperation, in part because of the overriding strength of outstanding political problems between the two states. [ ]

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After this year's disastrous attempt at opium eradication—a paramilitary action that resulted in at least eight deaths and only a small percentage of the crop destroyed—the government of *Pakistan* is likely to take firmer action to enforce its poppy ban during the next crop season. The Prime Minister's decision not to compensate farmers for poppy destroyed this year is a sign that the government will not give in to all the poppy growers' demands. We believe that Islamabad is aware that failure to eradicate the crop early in the growing season next fall will jeopardize further funding of international development projects. [redacted]

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In March, 38 suspected traffickers were arrested under *Nepal's* antidrug act, and people with Palace connections have been implicated in the drug dealing, [redacted]

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25X6

[redacted] We

25X6

believe that the order to crack down on traffickers probably came directly from the King, who is reportedly serious about the crackdown. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

Secret



**Secret**

**Secret**